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In the last decades, several philosophical theories have been brought 
together under the name of 4E Cognition. 4E Cognition (embodied, 
embedded, enactive and extended) is a field of interdisciplinary research 
combining philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, the social sciences, and 
others, based on the idea that mental activity is structured by dynamic 
interactions between the brain, body, and environment (in both physical and 
social sense).1 It brings together a series of approaches against neuro-centric 
and internalist approaches like computational and cognitive theories of 
mind.2 Against classical cognitivism, the 4E theories argue that the mind is 
not a passive box receiving neutral physical stimuli from the environment and 
that mental processes are not merely skull-bound (embodiment). Rather, the 
mind seems intrinsically linked to bodily actions towards the environmental 
context (embeddedness, enactment),3 and it actively incorporates 
environmental structures such as symbols, tools, artefacts, media, cultural 
practices, norms, groups, or even institutions (extendedness).4 Moreover, the 
mind is not conceived as an extra-natural property, nor a psychic entity that 
emerges from the body; rather the 4E cognition movement understands the 
mental as a dynamic process comprised of body-environment interactions 
and loops. In this sense, this anti-Cartesian position extends the issue of 
consciousness (and cognition in general) beyond the brain and the head, 
including the body and its relations with the environment. 
Despite the enormous interest aroused in recent years by these anti-
cognitivist theories, one could say that this approach is not new. The 4E 
theories seem to be rather an evolution of what classical phenomenology 
7 4  |  T h e  B o d y  S u r p a s s e d  T o w a r d s  t h e  W o r l d  a n d  P e r c e p t i o n  
S u r p a s s e d  T o w a r d s  A c t i o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVIII, No 1 (2020)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2020.927 
developed around the theme of corporeality during the twentieth century. 
There is nothing new under the sun in claiming that mental processes are 
formed starting from body-environment interactions, that perception and 
action are two sides of the same coin, and that through objects we can extend 
our consciousness and knowledge of the world. Of course, there are 
methodological differences, such as the strict connection between the 4E 
theories and the most recent developments in cognitive science and 
neuroscience; while classical phenomenology was based mainly – not 
exclusively – on the phenomenological analysis of the lived body in relation 
to the experienced world, the current results of the 4E theories are a mix of 
conceptual analysis and empirical investigation on how brain, body, and 
environment are linked together. Perhaps the most radical position from the 
4E Cognition is enactivism. “Enacted” means that something is put into 
action, and regarding the mind, it means that the cognitive processes can be 
understood as a dynamic interaction between the embodied mind and 
various affordances offered by the environment.5 Some phenomenologists, 
like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, or psychologists like Gibson, have been 
interpreted as precursors of the enactivist approach.6  
This paper aims to discuss similarities and differences between 
enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, who is usually not taken 
into consideration as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between 
phenomenological investigations and the 4E theories. First, I will introduce 
the concept of enactivism, presenting three specific theories, namely, 
sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical enactivism. Then, I will analyze Sartre’s 
position on corporeality, focusing on his phenomenology of the body as 
“surpassed towards the world.” This will allow me to compare his 
phenomenological approach with some fundamental concepts of enactivism: 
perception-action unity, anti-representationalism and anti-internalism 
(sensorimotor and radical enactivism in particular), organism-environment 
interaction and sense-making cognition (autopoietic enactivism in particular). 
In this regard, I will show affinities but also methodological and ontological 
differences between the two approaches; more specifically, I will argue that 
enactivism risks to underestimate some aspects that a complete theory of 
consciousness and cognition should not avoid, that is, subjectivity and 
existential meaning. In this sense, a Sartrean phenomenological-existentialist 
approach can enrich those naturalized enactivist accounts of consciousness 
that are merely based on the biodynamic and sensorimotor interactions 
between organism and environment. 
Varieties of Enactivism 
As said above, enactivism is a radical approach according to which 
cognition and consciousness are specific modalities of the “structural 
coupling”7 between organism and environment. For an enactivist, it is not 
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enough for the mind to be embodied and embedded in an environmental 
context, as well as extended through the use of tools. The enactivist positions 
are possibly even more radical, as they claim that it is the dynamic interaction 
between the environment and the organism that makes mental processes 
possible. In other words, there is not a pre-given mind that can be extended 
and embedded beyond the brain towards/within a pre-given world, rather 
cognition is from the beginning an intrinsic interaction between the organism 
and the world. This organism-object coupling implies that there are no 
representations of the world nor private inner states in the head, rather we 
directly deal with environmental objects through our bodily skills and 
abilities. Thus, enactivism is mainly characterized by an anti-
representationalist attitude, and some positions also support a strong direct 
realism, according to which we are immediately aware of external objects 
rather than through some kind of cognitive mediation.8 
There are three principal ways of interpreting enactivism.9 The first one 
is the sensorimotor approach according to which consciousness and cognition 
are not something that human beings “have” but something they “do.”10 To 
explain this point, Noë proposed the metaphor of dance, suggesting that 
consciousness is not something that happens to our nervous tissues but 
something that we do with and through our body that is incorporated within 
an environment, as the act of dance is something we actively do with our body 
in relation with the dance-floor and the other people dancing with us.11 
According to the stronger version, the actual moving body is essential for 
experience,12 while the weaker version argues that bodily movements as such 
are not necessary for the cognitive process, but rather the corresponding skills 
and practical knowledge (“know-how” instead of “know that”) a person has 
built up in the past, which are the enabling condition for performing a 
movement.13  
The second version is the autopoietic enactive approach, which interprets 
the body not simply in a neuromuscular sense, but as a system with specific 
abilities to regulate its interaction with the world.14 Cognition (and 
consciousness) is understood more broadly as a sense-making process of an 
autonomous system that tries to preserve itself as a precarious form of life 
within a world full of potential interactions (and dangers).15 In this sense, the 
autopoietic enactivism sustains that the mind is neither a property nor a 
substance but a specific organizational structure of life and that all living 
beings (even single cellular organisms) have a mental structure by their being 
alive (mind/life continuity).16 The body, therefore, is essential as one of the 
sub-systems that bear interactions with the world in order to regulate the 
whole cognitive system as an autonomous sense-maker.  
The third version, called radical enactive cognition (REC), analyzes the 
mind in terms of dynamic patterns of adaptive environmental interactions, 
trying to pursue an even stronger anti-cognitivism and anti-
representationalism, for example, rejecting the sense-making processes that 
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“insert” meaning and significance in the organism/environment relationship 
and proposing a more basic biodynamic coupling without any 
propositionally specifiable content.17 Thus, there are no mental 
representations at all nor meanings in a classical sense, contrarily sensory-
motor contingencies, bodily affects, postures, and movements enter cognition 
in a non-representational way.18 
Despite the differences, these positions have some common points that 
characterize the enactivist approach, that is, the incompatibility with any sort 
of internalism (for example, content- or vehicle-internalism) and 
representationalism, the main emphasis on the structural coupling between 
organism and environment, the focus on bodily skills and sensorimotor 
knowledge in relation with the belief that perception is always related to 
action.  
 
Sartre and Consciousness as Embodied-being-in-the-world 
The 4E theories take up from a new perspective some of the typical 
themes of classical phenomenology. Now, I will go deeper into this point, 
analysing a specific phenomenological position, namely, Sartre’s account of 
bodily consciousness and its relationship with the world. First, I will rely on 
Sartre’s early phenomenological studies, from The Imagination (1936) to Being 
and Nothingness (1943), re-evaluating his complex analysis of corporeality, 
often unfairly overshadowed by the studies of (and on) Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty. I will analyse bodily consciousness as intrinsically situated in and 
connected with the world, through a body that is often “surpassed” and 
“passed by in silence,” to use Sartre’s words. To build a bridge with 
contemporary studies of consciousness and the body, I will then compare 
Sartre’s phenomenological analysis with the key concepts of 4E Cognition. 
This will also lead me to consider the possibility that, to understand how we 
exist as our body, we need to understand first how we practically live in the 
world, seeking a new paradigm for the study of consciousness that is not 
founded either on the brain or body alone, but on our relationship with the 
world. This relationship may be called “embodied-being-in-the-world”19 and 
is similar to what nowadays is advocated by the 4E Cognition, in particular 
by enactivism. 
Why Sartre? 
Classical and contemporary phenomenology take the body into account 
as one of the main themes for a complete and reliable description of the 
experience, since there is no consciousness of the objects of the world without 
a body; even during instances of so-called disconnected consciousness, for 
example, in a dream or imagination, we cannot conceive ourselves completely 
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devoid of a body.20 For this analysis, I will make use of Sartre’s 
phenomenological ontology of the body. Someone might ask why Sartre and 
not Merleau-Ponty since the latter is known as perhaps the most important 
phenomenologist on the topic of the body; indeed some of his major works 
are specifically dedicated to the body and its relation with the world.21 
Merleau-Ponty’s works focused primarily on the body have likely 
overshadowed the bodily consciousness analysed by Sartre in the second 
chapter of the third part of Being and Nothingness.22 However, recently several 
authors23 have argued for the importance of Sartre’s contribution to the 
phenomenology of the body in relation with contemporary studies of 
embodied, embedded, extended and enactive cognition and against a neo-
Cartesian interpretation of his works.24 
 Another possible criticism might see Merleau-Ponty as the principal 
classical phenomenologist interested in combining phenomenological 
analyses with scientific findings, whereas Sartre is often depicted as an old-
fashioned philosopher. This would lead to doubting whether Sartre is the 
most suitable phenomenologist to cite in a study that intends to dialogue with 
contemporary approaches like the 4E Cognition movement. But this is a 
mistaken criticism since Sartre seizes upon information deriving from the 
psychology of his time and early neuroscience, particularly in his early 
works.25 Moreover, despite the categorical refusal to identify consciousness 
with the brain,26 he has never denied the close relationship between the brain, 
body as whole and consciousness.27 For these reasons, I consider Sartre’s 
phenomenological analysis of the body a crucial contribution to the 
understanding of consciousness as an “embodied-being-in-the-world.” 
The Body Surpassed Towards the World 
Starting with Sartre’s account of body and consciousness, perhaps the 
term “relationship” might be misleading because it involves two different 
poles conjoined by some kind of nexus, for example, physical, 
psychophysical, phenomenal, etc. This is not the case since for Sartre 
consciousness is nothing but bodily consciousness; there is no difference 
between the intentional acts and the processes of the body so that to speak of 
“embodied consciousness is not to say that consciousness happens to ride 
around inside the body.”28 On the other hand, it would be a mistake to confuse 
this intrinsic relation between body and consciousness with the identity of the 
two, as if Sartre wanted to pursue a behavioral approach towards 
consciousness, or with the unification of two different dimensions.  
In one sense therefore the body is a necessary characteristic 
of the for-itself; it is not true that the body is the product of 
an arbitrary decision on the part of a demiurge nor that the 
union of soul and body is the contingent bringing together 
of two substances radically distinct. On the contrary, the 
very nature of the for-itself demands that it be body; that is, 
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that, its nihilating escape from being should be made in the 
form of an engagement in the world.29 
For instance, Sartre considers the problem of the unification of mind and 
body a false problem, or what philosophers of mind call the “mind-body 
problem”; Sartre, instead of proposing a solution to it or claiming that it 
cannot be solved, argues for its dissolution. He shows how the attempt to put 
together our embodied experience and our material body – or the lived body 
(le corps-existé) and the body seen as an object (le corps-vu) – is an absurd 
attempt to unify two ontologically and not merely epistemically different 
dimensions: the body-for-me and the body-for-the-others.30 This does not 
mean that we have two entities, as for substantial dualisms, indeed we are 
embodied and united from the start of our experience, however we cannot 
perceive this form of embodiment unless we completely change it from pre-
reflective to reflective consciousness, making connections between the body 
as “lived” and the body as “had.” Thus, when we speak of the body-
consciousness relation according to Sartre, this relation must be developed 
outside of any physicalist or dualist paradigm, because body and 
consciousness are two different diffractions of the same phenomenon, where 
the body stands for the sign (the means) through which intentionality (the 
meaning) expresses itself. There is no meaning without the sign/means but 
you must surpass the sign (which remains in the background) to see the 
meaning of it.31  
This metaphor leads to another important point of the Sartrean 
phenomenology of the body, that is, the so-called lived body introduced by 
classical phenomenology (le corps-existé in the words of Sartre) is identical 
with the being-for-itself (être pour-soi; consciousness), therefore it is not 
something of which I constantly have consciousness, but it is “surpassed,” or 
nihilated, towards the world, as the pre-reflective non-positional 
consciousness of the revealing intentionality to the world. The body-for-itself 
“is never a given which I can know. It is there everywhere as surpassed; it 
exists only in so far as I escape it by nihilating myself.”32 Therefore it is nothing 
but the unseen condition of possibility of being-in-the-world:  
Therefore my body is a conscious structure of my 
consciousness. But precisely because the body is the point 
of view on which there can not be a point of view, there is 
on the level of the unreflective consciousness no 
consciousness of the body. The body belongs then to the 
structures of the non-thetic self-consciousness. […] Non-
positional consciousness is consciousness (of the) body as 
being that which it surmounts and nihilates by making 
itself consciousness – i.e., as being something which 
consciousness is without having to be it and which it passes 
over in order to be what it has to be. In short, consciousness 
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(of) the body is lateral and retrospective; the body is the 
neglected, the “passed by in silence.” And yet the body is 
what this consciousness is; it is not even anything except 
body. The rest is nothingness and silence.33 
Thus, the body is the orientation, the hidden point of view and the 
permanent structure of the conscious being within the world, in such a way 
that everything I perceive or even imagine is not somewhere without any 
reference to me. The body “[…] is therefore in no way a contingent addition 
to my soul; on the contrary, it is a permanent structure of my being and a 
permanent condition of possibility for my consciousness as consciousness of 
the world.”34 The world is not in front of me like an external and detached set 
of things; I am within it with a body that gives me the coordinates for the 
things of the world, so that the red tomato is on my left, while the door is 
behind me.  
But when we say that the for-itself is-in-the-world, that 
consciousness is consciousness of the world, we must 
beware of thinking that the world exists confronting 
consciousness as an indefinite multiplicity of reciprocal 
relations which consciousness surveys without perspective 
and contemplates without a point of view. For me this glass 
is to the left of the decanter and a little behind it; for Pierre, 
it is to the right and a little in front.35 
In this sense, spatiality is rendered through the body, not as an abstract, 
centreless, independent space but as “hodological space,” that is, a lived 
situation as a field of forces of the experiencers in relation with the world and 
its objects.36 When we are conscious of the red tomato, we can see it, touch it, 
taste it, weigh it with the hands, etc.; during these conscious acts of 
intentionality, at no time is the body revealed, the only intentional object is 
the red tomato, we do not see our eyes seeing, our fingers touching, our sense 
of taste tasting. When I weigh the tomato, I feel nothing but the tomato’s 
weight, in the same way as when I write my hand vanishes behind the words 
I am writing, “it is lost in the complex system of instrumentality in order that 
this system may exist. It is simply the meaning and the orientation of the 
system.”37 
 
Sartre and Enactivism 
After this presentation, I will try to link Sartre’s account of bodily 
consciousness and its relationship with some core concepts of the enactivist 
approaches, as a tool for interpretation. Enactivism indeed presents elements 
that can be compatible with the Sartrean phenomenology, but also several 
differences.38 
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The Perception-Action Unity 
Enactivism – in particular the sensorimotor one – argues for a close 
relationship between perception and action, as Sartre also sustained in Being 
and Nothingness. 
Thus the world from the moment of the upsurge of my For-
itself is revealed as the indication of acts to be performed; 
these acts refer to other acts, and those to others, and so on. 
It is to be noted however that if from this point of view 
perception and action are indistinguishable, action is 
nevertheless presented as a future efficacy which surpasses 
and transcends the pure and simple perceived. […] 
Perception is naturally surpassed toward action; better yet, 
it can be revealed only in and through projects of action. 
The world is revealed as an “always future hollow,” for we 
are always future to ourselves.39  
The fact that “perception is naturally surpassed toward action” reveals that 
for Sartre any object of the world is not passively perceived, rather actively 
reached, desired, awaited, searched, avoided, etc. by the agent’s 
intentionality. This means that the perceived object depends also by the 
perceiver’s set of potentially offered interactions, so that there is never only 
action or only perception, but it is two sides of the same coin. As Wider 
notes,40 Noë comes to very similar conclusions when he claims that perception 
is a kind of skilful bodily activity, although he only cites thinkers like 
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Gibson.  
Through attention, probing, and movements of the eyes, 
visual experience acquires content in much the same way 
that touch does. Vision, and touch, gain content through 
our skillful movements. We bring content to experience, by 
action. We enact content. [...] To summarize: Perceiving 
how things are is a mode of exploring how things appear. 
How they appear is, however, an aspect of how they are. To 
explore appearance is thus to explore the environment, the 
world. To discover how things are, from how they appear, 
is to discover an order or pattern in their appearances. The 
process of perceiving, of finding out how things are, is a 
process of meeting the world; it is an activity of skillful 
exploration.41 
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Furthermore, where Sartre speaks of the body as the foundation or the 
orientation that provides me all the potential interactions with the world 
(hodological space), Noë, in turn, speaks of sensorimotor contingencies, that 
is, the ground of possession of dispositions to respond to the presented 
object.42  
Nonetheless, while Noë (together with O’Regan) specifically focuses on 
the sensorimotor approach proposing an enactive interpretation of perception 
per se, the Sartrean phenomenological analysis is broader and full-bodied, 
where actions and spatial relations – as seen before – are only some of the 
features that constitute the body-world relation, since, for Sartre, every single 
object is not simply a source of sensorimotor information but also a whole set 
of meanings and possibilities for the agent.43 As Solymosi noted, the dancing 
metaphor used to describe the sensorimotor enactivism seems to be “more 
about the body than the brain or the environment.”44 
Anti-representationalism and Anti-internalism 
The next point concerns representations and mental states inside the 
head. In this regard, Sartre’s anti-representationalist and anti-internalist 
conception of consciousness45 can be compared to the “structural coupling” 
of organism and environment described by all the three enactivist 
approaches. According to Sartre, consciousness is completely devoid of 
contents, as an activity of pure directedness towards the world. This idea has 
been interpreted by Rowlands as the Intentionality Thesis, i.e. all 
consciousness is intentional,46 and the No Content Thesis, i.e. necessarily, any 
object of consciousness is outside consciousness, which is structured by 
conscious acts, for example, thinking, imagining, remembering, perceiving, 
etc.47 This leads to an anti-substantial and anti-idealist account of 
consciousness, in which consciousness is neither a sort of non-physical 
thing/psychic object/qualitative datum nor the foundation of the things in 
the world. Consciousness (pour-soi: being-for-itself) is intrinsically the 
disclosing activity (intentionality) to something transcendent to it, as 
something which is not consciousness (en-soi: being-in-itself), and this means 
that consciousness as intentionality necessarily needs to be supported by a 
being outside of it.48 In other words, there is no consciousness without a 
world, understood as a collection of potential or actual objects for 
consciousness, which instead is a mode of existence, a pure activity within the 
world (“hole of being”)49 on which it depends, while the world does not 
similarly depend on consciousness.50  
In this sense, Sartre can be conceived as bearing either an anti-idealist and 
externalist position on consciousness51 and a realist position on the world52 
and is therefore against any attempt to multiply substances or to add 
intermediary or mediating entities between the thing-in-itself and our 
experience, such as sensations/sense-data, mental images, etc.53  
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[…] [T]he image cannot in any way be reconciled with the 
necessities of synthesis if it remains an inert psychic 
content. It can only enter into the stream of consciousness 
if it is itself a synthesis and not an element. There are no and 
there couldn’t be any images in consciousness. But the 
image is a certain type of consciousness. The image is an act 
and not a thing. The image is consciousness of something.54  
Sartre here is arguing against what he defines as the “illusion of immanence,” 
or the attribution of spatial qualities to consciousness as a spatial container of 
mental states, representations, ideas, psychic objects in general;55 we cannot 
find anything in the brain and we do not re-present anything in our mind, 
rather consciousness is the disclosing activity of what we find in the 
surrounding environment.56 Moreover, he was critical of the idea that the 
brain contained images and perceptions, like an empirical version of the 
illusion of immanence.57 This error can be also attributed to all the current 
cognitive, representational and computational attitudes that aim to find out 
“where” consciousness is inside the brain. The anti-representationalism and 
anti-internalism sustained by the enactivists is quite similar to Sartre’s 
critiques of the psychology of his time.  
According to authors as Noë and O’Regan (sensorimotor approach), or 
Hutto and Myin (radical enactive approach), there are no contents, no sense-
data nor inner states in the head of the experiencing subject. For Noë and 
O’Regan and others perceiving is navigating and acting immersed into the 
environment, and this interaction is possible without the need of internal 
representation since the external movements as such – generated by the 
practical and dispositional knowledge of the subject – manipulate the 
environmental information (for example, sensitivity as movements correlated 
to external changes).  
We ourselves are distributed, dynamically spread-out, 
world involving beings. We are not world representors. We 
have no need for that idea. To put the point in a provocative 
way, we are, in Merleau-Ponty’s memorable phrase, ‘empty 
heads turned toward the world.’ And as a result of this, our 
worlds are not confined to what is inside us, memorized, 
represented. […] When I look out the window, it doesn’t 
seem to me as if all the environmental detail is represented 
in my consciousness; […] [w]hat I see is never the content 
of a mental snapshot; the world does not seem to be 
reproduced inside me. Rather – and this is the key – the 
world seems available to me.58 
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In particular, the body –  not just the brain – processes information and plays 
a representational role in a sensory-motor way, so that mental representations 
are not to be considered as vivid and detailed images in the head, but as an 
action-oriented and body-skill-relative way of interacting.59 Enactivists like 
Hutto and Myin, as the name says, are even more radical concerning this 
point; in addition to criticizing the still too representational, mediating and 
contentful nature of the sensorimotor knowledge, they also reject the idea that 
basic mentality it is inherently contentful.60 According to radical enactivism, 
representations of any kind indeed are not required to explain basic mentality, 
rather these alleged mental objects are usually invoked to explain the 
experience, but then they are in turn left unexplained.61  
[T]he representational description of the system does not 
add much to our understanding […] the representational 
gloss does not predict anything about the system’s behavior 
that could not be predicted by dynamical explanation 
alone. […] [I]n terms of the physics of the situation [game 
of cricket], the ball, the outfielder, and the intervening 
medium are just one connected thing. In effective tracking, 
that is, the outfielder, the ball, and the light reflected from 
the ball form a single coupled system. No explanatory 
purchase is gained by invoking representation here: in 
effective tracking, any internal parts of the agent that one 
might call mental representations are causally coupled with 
their targets.”62 
While the underlying idea is the same – the rejection of experience as the 
production of contentful representations or “psychic objects” – Sartre and 
enactivism develop this point in different ways. Sartre sustains that 
conceptual and content-involving representations are possible and sometimes 
inevitable for our way of thinking, but they are products of “impure 
reflection” (réflexion impure), therefore they do not correspond to a true 
phenomenological and ontological description of how experience takes place, 
but are the result of the hypostatization of conscious states.63 It seems that 
even radical enactivism admits that some non-basic kinds of cognition, for 
example, those associated with or dependent upon society and the mastery of 
language, are necessarily content-involving.64  
Naturalization 
This last point allows me to open here a brief parenthesis about 
phenomenal experience and naturalization. Radical enactivism aims at a 
complete account of consciousness and cognition in natural terms, through a 
non-reductive teleosemantic interpretation of intentionality.  
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RECers [Radical Enactivists about Cognition] are 
naturalists, albeit of a relaxed sort. They hold that it is 
possible, in principle, to explain the origins of content-
involving cognition in a scientifically respectable, gapless 
way. RECers aim to do so by making special reference to 
the important role played by sociocultural scaffolding. […] 
REC retains the idea from teleosemantics that intentional 
directedness has a normative dimension such that it does 
not reduce to mere behavior or dispositions. […] The 
natural attunements between organisms and their 
environments in the past not only structure the profile of an 
organism’s current tendencies for response, they 
normatively fix what is intentionally targeted, in 
complicated ways across multiple spatial and temporal 
scales.65 
In this regard, Sartre’s position focuses more on the phenomenological and 
existential dimension of corporeality and its relationship with the world, 
which is not taken into consideration by the biological and physical 
relationships between organism and environment proposed by radical 
enactivism (and also by the sensorimotor and autopoietic approaches). 
Although the Sartrean account of bodily consciousness has nothing to do 
with any naturalized approach, this does not mean that Sartre proposes a 
dualism between the physical level (le corps-vu) and the experiential level (le 
corps-existé) of the body. As seen previously, corporeality and consciousness 
are not two metaphysical entities, however, they represent two different and 
irreducible phenomenological ways of expressing and living the same 
phenomenon. Perhaps, this might be a point in common with what is argued 
in an article by Kirchhoff and Hutto on radical enactivism concerning the hard 
problem of consciousness. In this regard, they argue that problems like the 
mind-body problem or the hard problem of consciousness derive from 
unsustainable metaphysical premises, insisting that two irreducible types of 
description do not necessarily imply two metaphysically distinct entities.66 
Despite this, since they claim that “phenomenal experience is just dynamic 
activity grounded in agent-environment interactions,” they do not take into 
account any phenomenological analysis of bodily experience, like those 
developed by Sartre, risking to analyse merely the body-for-others.  
In this regard, Sartre’s analysis of the three ontological dimensions of the 
body highlights the limits of a reductive naturalistic approach. Sartre is in line 
with the classical Husserlian distinction between lived body (Leib) and body-
object (Körper), but he does not only criticize those who conceive the body as 
a mere object of physical description, rather he argues for a triple account of 
corporeality. The body is not only the somatic structure of our anatomical 
parts (1), the body-for-others (le corps-vu), but the orientation and condition of 
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possibility of our being-in-the-world (2), the body as being-for-itself (le corps-
existé). Additionally, this embodied-being-in-the-world (see section 3) is not 
constituted by a mere agent-environment opposition, rather is constantly 
confronted with other agents, hence intersubjectivity; in other words, our 
bodies – ourselves – are recognized as being manifest and evident to the 
others, as the object of their experience (3), or what Sartre calls “the third 
ontological dimension of the body” (la troisième dimension ontologique du 
corps)67, the body-I-recognized-as-object-for-others. These three dimensions of 
corporeality are distinct and irreducible to each other, but they intertwine and 
alternate each other in our experience of the physical and social world. In 
particular, the third dimension of the body can be particularly useful for 
enactivist account of bodily intersubjectivity,68 according to which 
interpersonal interactions influence or even structure the constitution of our 
self in the world; in this regard, the analysis of the objectifying power of the 
“look” of the other described by Sartre highlights how the relationships 
among embodied selves are not limited to the physical domain but have an 
existential meaning.69 
Organism-environment Interaction and Sense-making 
Cognition 
As seen, according to Sartre’s ontological phenomenology, there are not 
two original and independent poles, the world and consciousness, which 
become connected in a second step; rather our existence is situated and nested 
from the start within a meaningful world that, however, preserves and 
develops its meanings through the sense-disclosing interaction of 
consciousness. Generally speaking, the intrinsic union between environment 
and organism sustained by all the enactivist positions approximates the 
Sartrean conception. The subject, according to Sartre has not a vantage point 
from outside the world, and even bodily consciousness and cognition are not 
seen merely as an occasional extension of subjectivity beyond the head or the 
skin, as the Extended Mind Theory sustains, rather consciousness is from the 
beginning an act of interaction with tools which are in-the-midst-of-the-
world. Notably, in Sketch for a Theory of the Emotion (1939), Sartre exposes an 
instance of mereological fallacy ante litteram, thus well before it became a 
critical tool in the philosophy of neuroscience.70  
Simply because the head of a dog practically isolated from 
its body still gives signs of emotion, I cannot see that we 
have the right to conclude that the dog is feeling a complete 
emotion. Besides, even supposing that the existence of a 
corticothalamic sensitivity were established, it would still 
be necessary to ask the previous question: can a 
physiological disturbance, whatever it may be, render an 
account of the organized character of an emotion?71 
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Given the rejection of the brain as the “seat” of consciousness, and being 
the act of consciousness a disclosing activity of the world to the body of the 
subject, one could hypothesize a resemblance between Sartre’s account and 
the “Equal partner principle” defined by radical enactivism, according to 
which contributions of the brain does not carry greater explanatory weight 
nor are prioritized over those of body and the environment.72  
Concerning the brain-body-environment relationship, the intrinsic union 
between environment and organism sustained by all the enactivist positions, 
as explained above, approximates the Sartrean conception; however, it may 
be useful to focus on the kind of interactions involved. For Sartre every 
conscious act towards the world is constituted neither by the passive 
reception of external stimuli nor only by physical interactions, but also by an 
act of revealing meanings within an organised world; for example, in my daily 
experience nails and hammers are related from the start, because my 
consciousness is not a pure and contemplative act of knowledge of colours, 
shapes, textures etc. nor a mere sensorimotor kind of knowledge, but it 
generates meaningful linkages and references among things, contexts, my and 
other’s body and their functions in the world.  
Objects are revealed to us at the heart of a complex of 
instrumentality in which they occupy a determined place. 
This place is not defined by pure spatial co-ordinates but in 
relation to axes of practical reference. “The glass is on the 
coffee table;” this means that we must be careful not to 
upset the glass if we move the table. [...] In this sense 
perception is in no way to be distinguished from the 
practical organization of existents into a world. […] But 
these references could not be grasped by a purely 
contemplative consciousness. For such a consciousness the 
hammer would not refer to the nails but would be 
alongside them; furthermore the expression “alongside” 
loses all meaning if it does not outline a path which goes 
from the hammer to the nail and which must be cleared. 
The space which is originally revealed to me is hodological 
space; it is furrowed with paths and highways; it is 
instrumental and it is the location of tools.73 
In this sense, the consciousness-world relation sustained by Sartre is not 
merely spatial and temporal, but also involves contextual meanings and 
affections, therefore it is more full-bodied and complex compared to the 
biological and physical interpretation of the organism-environment coupling 
offered by sensorimotor and radical enactivisms.  
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Notably, we may find some similarities with the idea of sense-making 
cognition as proposed by the autopoietic enactive approach, but I would see 
this only as a weak suggestion. According to Sartre, 
The body is the totality of meaningful relations to the 
world. In this sense it is defined also by reference to the air 
which it breathes, to the water which it drinks, to the food 
which it eats. The body in fact could not appear without 
sustaining meaningful relations with the totality of what is. 
Like action, life is a transcended transcendence and a 
meaning. There is no difference in nature between action 
and life conceived as a totality. Life represents the ensemble 
of meanings which are transcended toward objects which 
are not posited as thises on the ground of the world.74 
Similarly, the concept of sense-making claimed by autopoietic enactivism 
refers to biological interactions between self-organizing living systems and 
the environment (at different levels: unicellular, animal, collective, socio-
technical)75, where the world is always and already meaningful in the “eyes” 
of the organism.  
“Sensemaking” describes behavior or conduct in relation to 
norms of interaction that the system itself brings forth on 
the basis of its adaptive autonomy. An adaptive 
autonomous system produces and sustains its own identity 
in precarious conditions, registered as better or worse, and 
thereby establishes a perspective from which interactions 
with the world acquire a normative status.76 
However, Sartre’s position is more specific and meant a pragmatic 
relationship between human experience and the environment as “human 
reality,” that is, a world as constituted by meanings made for and by 
humans.77 Indeed, an exhaustive account of experience cannot lack an 
existential analysis of human consciousness as a process of pragmatic sense-
making that deals not only with a world of tools and environmental 
interactions but also with our feeling “something it is like to be-in-the-world,” 
i.e. to exist as a subject within a human and intersubjective world of given 
meanings.  
More specifically, enactivism – autopoietic enactivism in particular – 
focuses on the dynamics between environment and organism in general, 
namely, the necessary biological interactions which are common to all living 
beings with any degree of cognition (sometimes including plants). In this 
ecological approach to cognition, the self-reflexive and existential aspect of 
human subjectivity is missing. This human specificity does not necessarily 
imply a return to an anthropocentric approach to the study of the mind and 
cognition (in fact I believe this was not even Sartre’s intention or interest) but 
requires the development of an integrated approach between enactivism and 
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phenomenology. For example, just as Sartre’s phenomenological 
investigation of the consciousness-world relationship could be supported by 
the biodynamic interpretation of contemporary enactivism, in the same way, 
the enactivist organism-environment coupling could be enriched by a more 
specific investigation of the interaction between the organism “human being” 
and the environment “world,” according to the Sartrean approach. In this 
regard, the human consciousness does not simply emerge from the system of 
dynamic interactions between organism and environment, rather is (also) the 
subjective stance through which there is something it is like to be involved 
with this world, that is, being “in-the-world” and not merely “in-the-midst-
of-the-world” as in case of objects. So, the environment considered as the 
background of biological interactions should be differentiated from the more 
specific human world, which determines the existential conditions of human 
consciousness and, at the same time, is disclosed by human consciousness as 
a structure of possibilities and meanings that go beyond the purely biological 
and physical domains.78 
 
Missing Subjectivity 
So far, I presented the affinity (yet not total compatibility) between 
Sartre's phenomenological approach and the varieties of contemporary 
enactivism. As shown above, there are also many differences, particularly in 
how the same topics – representations, action-perception, etc. – are 
approached, methodologically and ontologically speaking. However, I think 
that especially regarding the concept of subjectivity Sartre’s phenomenology 
of consciousness shows signs of incompatibility with the enactivist account. 
From an enactivist perspective, we can pursue a complete account of 
consciousness and cognition without involving any feature related to 
subjectivity. As I explained above, perception is intrinsically dependent on 
the actions we perform within the environment, while the subject-agent is the 
product of these interactions. Moreover, in its effort to clean consciousness 
out of all the mental properties, representations, etc. and to give an ecological, 
biodynamic account of the organism-environment coupling, enactivism 
seems to throw out the baby – subjectivity – with the bathwater.79  
In particular, the enactive version of the experience defended by Hutto 
and Ilundain-Agurruza presents an even more radical interpretation of 
minimal awareness, as a selfless and pre-cognitive activity where every 
experiential act is lived as “mine” only through subsequent discursive, 
reflexive processes of self-narration.80 Hutto and Ilundain-Agurruza specify 
in a note that “Sartre argued, contra classical phenomenology and in 
alignment with our stance, that the subject is not constitutive of experience 
per se but is rather constituted like other objects in experience.”81 This is 
partially true since Sartre’s pre-reflective consciousness – consciousness (of) 
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consciousness – has nothing to do with the constant and manifested presence 
of a self within the experience. As explained by Sartre in the Transcendence of 
the Ego, when I am running towards the departing tram I am not accessing my 
consciousness in a way like “I am running towards the tram,” rather there is 
only consciousness of the tram that must be reached, and I may not even 
remember which obstacles I avoided and whether there were other people 
along the sidewalk.82 Sartre says that the “transcendental field of this 
unreflected consciousness” is “impersonal, or, if you prefer, ‘prepersonal’, it 
is without an I”;83 the things of the world made the person, i.e. are the 
conditions for the emergence of an “I,” and not vice versa. The “I” is a product 
of the reflection and therefore it counts as another transcendent object of 
consciousness – useful, necessary, etc. but still a consequence of the conscious 
act, not the foundation of it.  
Nevertheless, I would not attribute to Sartre the idea that the basic 
experience is completely devoid of any subjectivity. It is not true that the only 
possible alternative to support the validity of the concept of subjectivity is to 
hypostatize a cognitive, narrative self or an I-subject detached from the body 
and the world. The fact that our consciousness can possess degrees of 
anonymity, spontaneity and impersonality does not mean that there is no 
room for self-consciousness, first-person giveness or for-me-ness. Despite the 
absence of a robust “I-subject,” i.e. the Ego as pivot and collector of all lived 
experiences, all consciousnesses are structured by a presence to itself, i.e. 
selfhood or “selfness” in the words of Sartre in Being and Nothingness.84 This 
condition of self-consciousness (what Sartre defines as “conscience de soi,” the 
pre-reflective cogito) is not necessarily and automatically manifested through 
every single moment of our daily life, nor, on the other hand, is it a cognitive 
reflection upon our states of consciousness, rather it is the non-intentional and 
non-objectifying condition for the subsequent high-order self-consciousness 
(what instead Sartre defines as “connaissance de soi,” the Cartesian cogito).85 
Without this precondition – necessarily non-sufficient – involved in any 
world-immersed experience, we would not be able to understand how we can 
reflect upon our conscious state at any moment. 
Moreover, for Sartre subjective phenomenal features are not properties 
of our mind – and this is consistent with enactivism – rather features of the 
things in the way they are manifested to us. 
So all at once hatred, love, fear, sympathy – all those famous 
“subjective” reactions that were floating in the malodorous 
brine of the mind – are pulled out. They are simply ways of 
discovering the world. Things are what abruptly unveil 
themselves to us as hateful, sympathetic, horrible, lovable.86 
Sartre strives to develop an account of consciousness that can consider the 
transphenomenality of being, i.e. the fact that the objects of consciousness are 
always outside and transcendent with all their qualitative characteristics, 
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without falling into the materialistic and reductive interpretation of “being 
conscious of something” as mere physical or biological interactions. In this 
sense, Sartre aims to strike a balance between the transcendent being of the 
world and the intake of consciousness (self-awareness and phenomenality) so 
that it is possible to avoid both idealism and mechanistic materialism. Sartre 
goes to the roots of the question concerning subjectivity and argues that 
existence (the for-itself, consciousness) is essentially an activity of negation, 
i.e. nothingness in the sense of the surpassing activity (dépassement) through 
the body, towards and within the world that permits the determination of 
itself as self-transcendence.87 In other words, consciousness as disclosing 
activity surpasses itself towards the objects of the world (see anti-internalism), 
so that it encounters being as something which is not itself, that is, which is 
not consciousness: “It is impossible to construct the notion of an object if we 
do not have originally a negative relation designating the object as that which 
is not consciousness.”88 Instead of being a Cartesian I-subject that determines 
the existence of external objects or a pure biodynamic interaction between an 
organism and the environment, this negative relation permits, at the same 
time, the determination of the object as part of an infinite series of appearances 
and the recognition of myself as the subject to which this series is manifested:  
The reality of that cup is that it is there and that it is not me. 
We shall interpret this by saying that the series of its 
appearances is bound by a principle which does not depend 
on my whim. But the appearance, reduced to itself and 
without reference to the series of which it is a part, could be 
only an intuitive and subjective plenitude, the manner in 
which the subject is affected. If the phenomenon is to reveal 
itself as transcendent, it is necessary that the subject himself 
transcend the appearance toward the total series of which 
it is a member.89 
This distinction between subjectivity and what is not subjectivity is what is 
missing in sensorimotor and radical enactivisms, as the analysis of the 
sensorimotor skills and the organism-environment coupling is devoid of any 
reference to this dynamic. From the autopoietic enactivist perspective, one 
might interpret the organism’s autopoietic system in interaction with the 
environment and its sense-making process as the biodynamic structure from 
which subjectivity emerges; however, this hypothesis might be a little far-
fetched. Surely, what enactivism in general misses is the investigation of 
subjectivity as the pre-reflective bodily self-awareness, which is to say the pre-
cognitive process that both is self-transcendence through the body towards 
the world and self-positing as something – a body – different from the 
transcended objects of the world.90  
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Conclusion 
Sartre’s account of consciousness is grounded on a complex and wide-
ranging analysis of the body, recently revisited and re-evaluated by many 
scholars. According to Sartre, our experience is always embodied, but the 
body per se is not the real centre of his analysis, rather it is the body as 
intrinsically related to the external context, that is, the body passed by silence 
and surpassed towards the world. We have seen how this can be interpreted 
also through the lenses of enactivism. Some key points of enactivism can be 
identified within the Sartrean account of consciousness (anti-
representationalism, externalism, action-perception, organism-environment 
interaction), however the way these concepts are developed is different. 
Notably, Sartre mainly focuses on the phenomenological-existential 
dimension of being embodied and enacted in the world, whereas enactivism 
develops the physical-biological structures of the dynamic interaction 
between organism and environment. Nonetheless, this methodological – but 
also ontological – difference does not necessarily imply the rejection of a 
potential integrative approach with the Sartrean phenomenology. Rather, it 
can indicate to current enactivism some potential ways of complementing the 
investigation of consciousness and cognition. In particular, I suggest that 
Sartre may inspire enactivism to pay greater attention to the concept of 
subjectivity as pre-reflective, self-aware, embodied transcendence towards 
the world, as well as to support the naturalized description of the organism-
environment coupling with a phenomenological investigation of the 
specifically human meaning correlated with these biodynamic interactions.  
Lastly, enactivism underestimates the plurality of perspectives towards 
corporeality. Sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical enactivisms get the point 
by highlighting the importance of the body-environment relationship for an 
adequate account of consciousness and cognition. However, their 
contribution is limited to the dimension that Sartre defines as the body-for 
others, namely, the body structured by physical properties described by a 
third-person perspective. This perspective could be completed or at least 
enriched by the two other existential conditions of the body elaborated by 
Sartre, namely, the body-for-itself and the third ontological dimension of the 
body. 
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